PANIC -- Plugging Data Leak Detection into the Camunda Modeler by Türker, Jasmin & Heinze, Thomas S.
PANIC – Plugging Data Leak Detection into the
Camunda Modeler
Jasmin Tu¨rker1 and Thomas S. Heinze2
1 Institute of Computer Science
Friedrich Schiller University Jena
jasmin.tuerker@uni-jena.de
2 Institute of Data Science
German Aerospace Center (DLR)
thomas.heinze@dlr.de
Abstract. We present PANIC, a certiﬁed data leak detection tool,
implemented as a plugin for the Camunda Modeler. With the help of
our tool, process designers can detect data leaks instantaneously and
interactively. The current prototype supports arbitrary BPMN processes
with data logic implemented as inline scripts of a Groovy subset.
1 Introduction
Business processes are often subject to regulations governing the conﬁdentiality
and privacy of the information that is dealt with. To avoid accidental disclosure of
sensitive or private data, automated process auditing can be a useful method. In
this paper, we present a static analysis plugin for the popular Camunda Modeler 3
tool for modeling business processes in BPMN. Our plugin implements a data
ﬂow analysis, which allows for detecting data leaks at process design time.
A data ﬂow analysis analyzes the propagation of data in a business process.
Our analysis thereby distinguishes between data objects of two diﬀerent sensitivity
levels: low, representing objects originating from an insensitive data source, and
high, representing objects from a sensitive data source. In order to guarantee the
absence of data leakage, the analysis has to check that no high-level object is
propagated to an untrusted, that is low-level sink. In contrast, any ﬂow of objects
between equal levels or from low-level source to high-level sink is allowed.
Our plugin is thus based on a two-level security model for mandatory access
control. Technically, the plugin therefore implements a uniﬁed points-to/taint
analysis [3] to track the ﬂow of sensitivity-labeled data objects inside a business
process. The analysis has been formally proven correct using a mechanized proof,
such that the analysis is also an instance of a certiﬁed data ﬂow analysis. Based on
our previous work detailing the analysis and its veriﬁcation [4], the contribution
of this paper is the prototype implementation of the PANIC analysis plugin.
3 https://camunda.com/
Fig. 1. Screenshot of the PANIC data leak detection plugin
2 Data Leak Detection Plugin
In the Camunda Modeler, process data of BPMN business processes can be
modeled by process variables, messages, and (inline) scripts. While a number of
programming languages are supported for deﬁning inline scripts in the Camunda
platform, our plugin currently only supports a small subset of the Groovy
language, where Groovy is a JVM-based language providing an object-oriented
data model. A process activity can be decorated as script task and attached a
Groovy script, which gets access to a local copy of the process variables and
messages, and to an API for committing local changes back to the variables and
messages. To distinguish between low- and high-level objects, we deﬁned a BPMN
extension to decorate an activity as source of sensitive data or as untrusted sink.
This applies in particular to inbound and outbound message activities, which
can be marked as sources and sinks by the process designer, respectively.
Task of the data leak detection plugin is to reason about the ﬂow of labeled
data objects as deﬁned by process variables, messages, and inline scripts. The
plugin is therefore implemented as a client-server application, where the client is
the plugin itself, providing the Camunda Modeler GUI extensions and bindings,
and the server implements the actual analysis in the OCaml programming
language. Note that the analysis implementation is directly generated from its
correctness proof and only once at plugin installation time. The analysis can
run in just milliseconds each time a BPMN process is modiﬁed in the Camunda
Modeler, thus supporting interactive and instantaneous modeling and analysis.
3 Demo
The implementation of the PANIC plugin is available online4. Using the plugin,
a process designer can easily identify ﬂaws in her process model with respect to
potential data leaks. Figure 1 shows a simple BPMN process for a ﬁctive risk
assessment of a health insurance company, where a sensitive medical record is
4 https://gitlab.com/fu63rov/camunda-static-analysis-plugin
propagated to an unstrusted sink. As can be seen, the plugin identiﬁes this ﬂaw
in the process model and notiﬁes the process designer. In the demo, we will show
how a process designer can interact with the plugin, while creating a BPMN
process model step-by-step, to identify and repair potential data leaks.
4 Related Work
Mandatory access control is a standard security model for data conﬁdentiality [2],
where access is granted based on policies using security classiﬁcation levels such
that access from a lower classiﬁed object to a higher classiﬁed object is prohibited.
Process modeling and analysis with respect to mandatory access control has been
a topic in the business process domain in recent years. Analysis usually applies
the Petri net formalism, e.g., mapping data leak detection to the reachability
problem as in [1]. However, we are not aware of any work which considers actual
process data in terms of variables, messages, and even scripts modifying them,
nor do we know tool support in process modeling applications like Camunda.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this demo paper, we have presented a prototype implementation for a Camunda
Modeler plugin which allows a process designer to detect potential data leaks
while creating BPMN process models. In its current version, the plugin is able
to analyze data logic implemented as inline scripts of a subset of the Groovy
language. In future work, we would like to extend the plugin to cover full Groovy
as well as other programming languages supported by the Camunda platform.
In particular, we wish to integrate support for the Java language and respective
delegate classes, which are usually implementing a process’ service tasks. Besides,
we are working on making the analysis more precise, increasing precision by
means of ﬂow-sensitivity.
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